This special issue comprises of twelve selected papers from the International Symposium on Electronic Commerce Security (ISECS 2009), Nanchang, China, 22-24 May 2009. The conference received 1050 paper submissions from 19 countries and regions, of which 487 were selected for presentation after a rigorous review process. From these 487 research papers, through two rounds of reviewing, the guest editors selected twelve as the best papers on the Computers track of the Conference. The candidates of the Special Issue are all the authors, whose papers have been accepted and presented at the ISECS 2009 and WISA 2009, with the contents not been published elsewhere before.
    The ISECS 2009 and WISA 2009 are sponsored by Nanchang HangKong University, China, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Nanchang University (China), Jiangxi Normal University (China), Wuhan University (China), National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sichuan University (China), and Jiaxing University (China). Technical Co-Sponsors of the conference are IEEE, IEEE Computer Society, and IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on E-Commerce.
    “A framework for an ontology-based e-commerce product information retrieval system”, by Liyi Zhang, Mingzhu Zhu and Wei Huang, proposes a framework for an ontology-based e-commerce product information retrieval system, and proposes an ontology-based adaptation of the classical Vector Space Model with the consideration of the weight of product attribute. Based on the framework, a product information retrieval system which is intended to search the product information in B2C environment is developed. The main objective of this system is to facilitate users to search the object product when they carry out e-commerce activities.
    “Provably Secure Certificate-based Proxy Signature Schemes”, by Jiguo Li, Lizhong Xu, Yichen Zhang, proposes two certificate-based proxy signature schemes, which are shown to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Compared with the certificate-based proxy signature scheme in CT-RSA 2004, one of our schemes enjoys the same signature length and computation cost, another one requires a little more computation and communication cost.

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